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Much has been written about theory and practice in the law, and the tension
between practitioners and theorists. Judges do not cite theoretical articles often; they
rarely "apply" theories to particular cases. These arguments are not revisited. Instead
the Article explores the working and interaction of theory and practice, practitioners
and theorists. This Article starts with a story about solving a legal issue using our
intellectual tools-theory, practice, and their progenies: experience and "gut." Next
the Article elaborates on the nature of theory, practice, experience and gut. The third
part of the Article discusses theories that are helpful to practitioners and those that
are less helpful. The Article concludes that practitioners theorize, and theorists practice. They use these intellectual tools differently because the goals and orientations of
theorists and practitioners, and the constraints under which they act, differ. Theory,
practice, experience and gut help us think, remember, decide and create. They complement each other like the two sides of the same coin: distinct but inseparable.

A

COMMENT ON LANGUAGE AND NORMS

IN COMPLEX BUSINESS CONTRACTING

Claire A. Hill

Complex contracts, such as those governing loans and acquisitions, create a state
of the world-parties entering into a contract thereby become bound. The contract
expressly summons up legal consequences for every promise it contains. But the relationship between the promises and the law's force is attenuated. Very often contract
provisions set the stage rather than provide the script: accommodation seems more the
rule than the exception. Indeed, for most contracting parties, the law's specter is one
of many reasons to do what they promised to do, and often, not the most important
reason. Parties also feel constrained by reputational and other extralegal forces within
the complex contracting community. Moreover, the process of contracting itself can
serve to elicit information and compliance. The combination of legal and extralegal
forces permits parties to craft a constrained, yet flexible, relationship-probably the
best the parties can do given the limits of language, knowledge and imagination.
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WHY CONTRACTS ARE WRITTEN

ClaireA. Hill

IN "LEGALESE"

59

Contracts have been reviled since before the Marx Brothers' infamous "there
ain't no Sanity Clause" sketch as being replete with duplicative, cumbersome, inartful,
and sometimes imprecise language. My Article seeks to understand why practice apparently hasn't made perfect-why the contract production process hasn't been honed
to a point that contracts are as clear, and only as long, as would seem to be optimal. I
argue that the contracting production process combines rational, and what some
would consider irrational, elements to create a serviceable, but arguably second-best,
product. But I also argue that what counts as second-best in this and other contexts
may be harder to discern than is generally thought.
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HARBOR FOR DISHONEST CONDUCT

Lawrence M. Solan

87

The parol evidence rule excludes extrinsic evidence of prior or contemporaneous
understandings of an agreement when the parties have signed a document that purports to encompass their entire understanding. In theory, this rule is designed to add
certainty to business transactions and to inhibit the introduction of unreliable evidence into the litigation system. But in practice, if we eliminate the introduction of
precontractual representations and understandings from the dispute resolution process, we create a safe harbor for unethical business practices in the early stages of
contract formation. Using insights from linguistics and psychology, the Article argues
that this problem is likely to occur regardless of what version of the rule is applied in
any particular circumstance. Therefore, this Article recommends solutions from
outside the law of contract to address both precontractual misconduct and false testimony in the courtroom. It recommends stronger sanctions against dishonest testimony in business disputes, and stronger consumer protection to avoid precontractual
heavy-handedness and outright fraud.
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and Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law
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WHO OWNS A CORPORATION
AND WHO CARES?

Richard A. Booth

This Article focuses on the conventional theory that a corporation is owned by its
stockholders and argues that the theory retains little if any explanatory or predictive
force. After a brief consideration of the need for and function of legal theories in
general and the evolution of the stockholder ownership theory, the Article proceeds
to describe how the takeover wars of the 1980s brought into high relief the unavoidably conflicting interests of stockholders and managers, owing primarily to the fact
that investor-stockholders are free to diversify whereas managers generally are not.
Although the stockholder ownership theory is consistent with the duty to maximize
stockholder wealth in the context of a sale of the entire corporation, there are numerous situations in which corporation law and norms recognize the legitimate interests of
managers and controlling stockholders to the exclusion or detriment (but not both) of
public stockholders, including controversies (real or potential) involving stock offerings, poison pills, sales of control, and management compensation. Finally, the Article
considers whether the theory of corporate ownership may make a difference in the
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outcome of real-world controversies, and concludes that it has affected the holding in
several recent appraisal cases in which the courts have held that stockholders are entitled to a premium for control even though the transactions at issue did not involve a
change of control. Numerous commentators have argued from problems with the
stockholder ownership theory to the conclusion that management duty should be
viewed as owed to a variety of stakeholder constituencies. Most recently, it has been
suggested that the separation between ownership and control may be best understood
as a response to team production problems. This Article suggests that a third approach makes more sense, namely, that manager-owners effectively hire public stockholders to provide liquidity and an objective measure of performance (among other
things). In other words, going public is not necessarily a result of a need for capital
and should not therefore be seen as constituting a transfer of ownership to the public.
IMPLICATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER
DIVERSIFICATION ON CORPORATE LAW
AND ORGANIZATION: THE CASE OF
THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE

Peter V. Letsou

179

The business judgment rule has been a centerpiece of corporate law for almost
two centuries. But over the last several decades, courts and commentators have struggled to find a rationale for the business judgment rule that, at once, reconciles the
judicial deference granted to corporate managers with the more demanding standards
applied to other professionals, such as doctors and lawyers. This Article attempts to
end this struggle by offering a fuller account of the relationship between the preferences of diversified shareholders, on the one hand, and liability rules, on the other.
Based on this account, this Article contends that the protections of the business judgment rule are necessary to address a concern unique to the corporate setting: the need
to prevent diversifiable risk from dominating agent (i.e., managerial) decision making.
THE VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENT BUST:
DID AGENCY COSTS PLAY A ROLE?

WAS IT SOMETHING LAWYERS
HELPED STRUCTURE?

Joseph Bankman 211
and Marcus Cole

This Article examines the question of why venture capital firms would continue
to raise technology funds, and then invest those funds, when they were certain that the
business markets for such investments were overvalued preceding the "crash" of April
2000. We interviewed a number of venture capitalists, lawyers, entrepreneurs, and
other industry observers in search of an explanation. The explanations offered by key
decision makers for the observed investment behavior can be categorized as of three
types of theories: agency cost theories, herd behavior and other cognitive bias theories, and non-agency cost theories. Agency cost theories suggest that the activity took
place because of the divergence between the long-term reputational and other interests of fund general partners (venture capital firms), and the short-term interests of
their limited partner investors. Herd behavior explanations apply herding theory to
the general movement of venture capital firms, but fail to provide a satisfactory explanation for the direction of the "herd." Non-agency cost theories include explanations
premised upon gaming strategies by better-informed venture capitalists in the context
of less-informed public markets at the end of the investment pipeline. All of the theories surveyed are problematic in at least some respects, and none fully explains the
pattern of investment observed.
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ROBERT PRrrZKER, President and Chief Executive Officer, The Marmon Group,
Inc.; ROBERT H. SrrKoFF, Assistant Professor of Law, Northwestern University

School of Law.
INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC
LEGAL REFORM IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES:
THE CASE OF COMPETITION POLICY AND

William E. Kovacic 265

ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT

The widespread adoption by transition economies of competition policy systems
raises important questions about the design and phasing of legal reforms in emerging
markets. Success in transition economies in developing useful competition policy programs and other economic legal reforms requires close attention to the establishment
of public and private institutions whose effective operation is essential to a legal regime. Properly conceived competition policy programs that account carefully for national circumstances can play a constructive role in promoting economic growth. The
content of such programs can be structured to match the institutional capacity of each
nation, and the mix of policy instruments can be adjusted over time as requisite institutions are improved. The enhancement of supporting institutions should be a priority
for technical assistance projects.

CENTENNIAL LECTURE
WHY SOME COUNTRIES ARE RICH AND

Douglass C. North

SOME ARE POOR

319

Professor North describes the difficulties encountered in promoting development:
although economists are well aware of the conditions that promote productivity and
creativity, only formal rules can be easily changed. Formal rules are but one part of a
set of institutions in which people operate: informal norms of behavior and the enforcement mechanisms for both formal and informal rules have profound effects on
human thought and activity. Economists have traditionally endeavored to impose
simplistic sets of formal rules on developing countries; this model is largely ineffective
because it ignores the role of culture and beliefs in shaping behavior. The difficult but
effective alternative requires study of a society's culture to understand ways in which
the formal rules may be changed-consistent with the culture and belief system-to
encourage productive and creative activity.

STUDENT NOTES
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LESSONS FOR

ILLINOIS FOLLOWING CALIFORNIA'S
EXPERIENCE WITH ELEcTRICITY
RESTRUCTURING

William A. Borders 333

State by state the role of generation, transmission, and distribution is becoming
more dynamic and market driven as regulated electric monopolies shed their vertically
integrated structures and reinvent themselves for the competitive marketplace. California's turbulent move to an open electricity market provides a good example of how
this process can go wrong. This Note highlights some of the key developments in
California's recent energy troubles, and considers the unique challenges for the Illinois electricity market. Borders concludes that through new federal and state transmission policy, heightened demand response, and consumer education programs,
regulators can ensure that the market sends price signals to customers and that customers will have the means to respond to market information. Once provided with
adequate transmission, pervasive demand response technologies, and a heightened understanding of the structure of electricity markets, consumers will have the tools nec-

essary to purchase electricity from diverse suppliers, react quickly to market
fluctuations, and stimulate a vibrant power market at the wholesale and retail levels.

A

COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO CONFLICTS

BETWEEN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS AND
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION AFTER

Boy SCOUTS

OF AMERICA V. DALE

Adrianne K. Zahner 373

This Comment examines the United States Supreme Court decision in Boy Scouts
of America v. Dale, which held that New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination violated
the First Amendment by preventing the Boy Scouts from discriminating on the basis
of sexual orientation in the selection of members and troop leaders. Zahner analyzes
the Dale decision in light of prior freedom of expressive association case law, and
reconciles inconsistencies by proposing a comprehensive framework for dealing with
conflicts between antidiscrimination laws and freedom of expressive association. The
proposed framework provides absolute protection for freedom of association for
purely expressive groups, very limited protection for purely economic organizations,
and varying degrees of protection for hybrid associations with independent expressive
and economic agendas. This approach effectively meets recognized rationales for
freedom of expression, and provides optimal results with respect to politicization of
personal characteristics.
THE SAME-SOVEREIGN RULE RESURRECTED:
THE SUPREME COURT REJECTS THE INVOCATION
OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT'S PRIVILEGE
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION BASED UPON
FEAR OF FOREIGN PROSECUTION
IN UNITED STATES V. BALSYS

Carlin Metzger 407

In United States v. Balsys, the Supreme Court examined the scope of the Fifth
Amendment's Privilege Against Self-Incrimination when invoked based on a fear of
foreign prosecution. Applying the "same-sovereign" rule, the Court held that the Fifth
Amendment only binds the government to which it applies and, therefore, the privilege cannot be invoked based solely upon a fear of foreign prosecution. This Comment analyzes the rationale in prior Supreme Court decisions addressing the scope of
the privilege against self incrimination and contends that despite the Court's revival of
the same-sovereign rule in Balsys, the privilege can extend to witnesses who can show
a real and substantial fear of foreign criminal prosecution, direct aid by the United
States to foreign prosecuting authorities, and a complementary system of criminal justice in the United States and the prosecuting state.

